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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
Dr. Chiu called the session into order and announced that the
floor was now open for discussion.
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.]
DISCUSSION
VALERIE WATTS JAMES: I have a question for Mr. Wu. I am
Assistant Professor of International Law and Political Science at
Morgan State University. Mr. Wu made reference to the fact that
there are no strikes in Taiwan, or very few strikes. He also
mentioned the unions. What positions do unions play insofar as
the economy of the ROC is concerned?
DR. CHIu: Dr. Wei will be more competent to answer that
question.
DR. WEI: There are labor unions in Taiwan, and their way of
getting what they want is not to strike, but to put pressure upon
the government, and through the government to put pressure
upon the factories. For instance, when the pay of some local
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factory financed by foreign investors is too low in the opinion of
the workers, then the workers have several ways of getting what
they want. In the first place, they can make their wage demand to
the owner of the factory directly. In most factories there is
someone called the officer of labor relations, so usually this
worker or representative of the workers goes to that officer and
says, "It's too low, we have to increase the pay." If they cannot
find satisfactory answers from the factory, then they can go to the
provincial or City Bureau of Social Affairs. There is a branch in
that Bureau which can serve as an intermediary between the
workers' group and the factory. So this is the way to get things
done. Maybe this is in the traditional Chinese cultural context and
is not by direct confrontation. It's by some kind of behind-the-
scenes maneuver that the workers are able to get what they want.
That's as much as I can say. I do not know the detailed legal
arrangements as to how the workers actually resolve differences
between themselves and the factory owners.
DR. HEUSER: I would like to ask Dr. Wei another question. Dr.
Wei emphasized in his quite articulate overall presentation of the
present circumstances in Taiwan, that Taiwan will remain a
democratic land. It seems to me that people in western countries
are wondering why despite the facts that in Taiwan there are
economic improvement and political stability, as well as a
growing living standard, nevertheless the country is still in a
situation of emergency and martial law. People in western
countries are interested to hear something from the people who
are in government in Taiwan why this is so, because for us it is
not easy to understand, viewing the facts I have just mentioned.
DR. WEI: As to this question, again I will answer not in the
legal sense; I think Dr. Chiu can add to my answer in that regard.
I will give you essentially a political assessment of the situation.
Taiwan has martial law, but no curfew. There are cases in which
there are constant curfews in some countries, such as in South
Korea and the Philippines, and there are nations in which curfew
is the martial law. We have martial law, but no curfew. The
martial law has been declared more for preparation for the
possible emergence of a critical situation. In other words, at least
formally speaking, we are still in continuous conflict with
Mainland China, and if you review the developments after 1971
after we withdrew from the U.N., then I think we have a pretty
good record in protecting civil rights, particularly in the areas of
private citizens. South Korea, to my knowledge, has nine times
declared national emergencies, and the Philippines has suspended
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its democracy by proclaiming martial law for the whole country,
and Thailand has a coup and student revolt. What we did, we not
only resisted any change in the form of government, we initiated
two supplementary national elections, adding more than fifty new
members to the national Yuan, to the Control Yuan, and to the
National Assembly. People have asked this question of martial
law again and again. We are aware of this problem, and we are
concerned with this problem, but again, my answer here is that it
is more for preparation for a possible emergency situation rather
than actually applying every facet of law to restricting the
freedom of the people of Taiwan.
DR. CHIU: With respect to the question of martial law, I just
want to remind you that there is a de facto martial law curfew in
all United States cities. So I warn you not to go out after the
conference is over in the evening (laughter). But martial law here
is enforced not by the government but by the gangsters in this
country.
QUESTION [to Prof. Prybyla; speaker unidentified]: What is the
viability of economic expansion in the ROC?
PROF. PRYBYLA: There are some problems. I'll mention some
of the less innocuous factors. I think there is serious question
among some Chinese as to viability in some labor projects. There
is some question in the people's minds as to the educational
qualifications of the labor leaders in the Republic of China. There
is, I think, a certain growing restlessness, too, in the labor force,
in regard to wage structures, wage levels, consumer aspirations
and so on, which may not be as easily dealt with by legal
injunctions. . . there are problems, I think, in management, the
quality of management in Chinese firms. So these are some. And
also, I am not as optimistic about the future international climate
for investment in Taiwan as some of the speakers. I do tend to
share Mr. Wu's and Mr. Wei's fears that some shift in our
relations with China may very adversely affect the climate of
investment. I am not sure whether Ms. Schroder mentioned this -
I think she did - but much of the foreign investment, especially
American investment in Taiwan, is rather short-term in terms of
equity. This may be in part because of the concentration of
investment in light industry. But it is symptomatic that the
United States investor has confidence in the future of Taiwan, but
it is not very long-term.
QUESTION [speaker unidentified]: How much investment in
Taiwan is short-term?
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DR. WEI: I agree with Ms. Schroder that a more extensive
answer to this question should be based upon a careful review of
data. But I can base an answer on my own experience up here as
an Eisenhower Fellow visiting the U.S. While I was in New York I
met with four major bank executives, including the J. P. Morgan
Bank & Trust Co., I asked a question, "Before you loan the money
to the ROC, with whom do you check? Do you check with the U.S.
Department of Commerce or Export-Import Bank?" And I got an
answer from the J. P. Morgan vice-president for foreign invest-
ment. He told me that we rely on our own experts; we make our
own assessments, because the amount of money is too large to be
insured by anybody, so we'd better be sure what we're doing. So
they invested in a loan for building six nuclear power plants, and
.this is a very large amount of borrowing. Of course we Chinese in
Taiwan are more careful, you may say more prudent, in borrowing
money. In our economic situation, we could have borrowed much
more. If we follow, say, the example of Korea, we would have at
least doubled or tripled our borrowing from international markets.
But we want to maintain our good record and to maintain a
relatively low portion of our economy which is based upon
borrowing money. So this much I can say. The kind of projects
which involve large amounts of money are on long-term loans, not
short-term loans. I know less about the investment part, but I do
know about the loan part.
Ms. SEUNARINE: This question is for Mr. Pilachowski. I would
like you to comment on whether Maryland National Bank finds
any special allure in the Republic of China as compared to other
eastern countries for investment.
MR. PILACHOWSKI: We find it a great deal more attractive
than some other countries. We are primarily a bank concerned
with the financing of trade, again connected with the Port of
Baltimore. The Republic of China offers us as an institution an
opportunity to do both the medium-term lending that Dr. Wei was
referring to and short-term lending. If you look at other countries,
their demand for short-term funds is not as strong, and also we
view them as being less stable for varying reasons. Other
developing Asian countries have been mentioned - I do not mean
that we do not do business with those places also. But our desire to
increase our business is dependent upon more immediate evidence
of stability in those countries than is presently seen vis-a-vis what
we see in the Republic of China. It's a very favorable atmosphere
for us. The only more favorable atmosphere is that of Japan.
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QUESTION [speaker unidentified]: I want to comment on Dr.
Heuser's remark about national emergency in Taiwan. Actually,
the United States has been in a national emergency since 1917.
Indeed, that's how the President regulates foreign activity. My
question is, what do you see as the ultimate situation in the
Republic of China - what will it be in the year 2000?
DR. CHIU: I think I will call Dr. Wei to answer that question,
as a scholar, not as a government official (laughter).
DR. WEI: Thank you very much, Hungdah. You have just
saved my case. Let me put it this way. Let me give you three
pitfalls which we try not to fall into. I have met so many people in
the United States while representing the ROC in Taiwan in
varying capacities, first as Director of the Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, and now as Chairman of the Research,
Development and Evaluation Commission. There are several
traps which we can fall into if we are not careful. One is that
Taiwan can continue trading (after the U.S. has normalized its
relations with the PRC); and that Taiwan is now economically so
good that it does not need formal ties with the U.S. So to the
person who asks, "Do you think Taiwan's economy is good?" One
may say, "Yes, it is good." "Do you think Taiwan's economy can
withstand any shock?" One may say, "I think maybe yes." "Then
why should you worry about diplomatic ties with the U.S.? We
think you can stand any shock." This is one pitfall. Another
question asked is, "You people have been very successful in
dealing with unfavorable money situations since 1971. You have
been able to even increase trade with countries with which you
have no ties - is that correct?" One would say, "Yes." "And you
have developed substantive ties with many countries (without
diplomatic ties with the ROC)." One would say, "That's correct."
Then they say, "Why should you worry about ties with the U.S.A.?
You have developed a whole bunch of substantive ties. You can
keep up the same thing." This is another pitfall. The third pitfall
is this: "Is Taiwan secure?" Now, the instinctive response is, "Yes,
Taiwan is secure." "Well, can you be secure in the near future?
Can you defend yourself against Mainland China?" We are more
likely to answer, "Yes, we will be able to defend against Mainland
China." "Then, why should you worry about a defense treaty?"
These three pitfalls I have encountered again and again. I got so
tired of it that whenever I had anything to do in the U.S.A., I
would say first, let me tell you three things. Then we are in
business.
My honest evaluation as a person trained in development,
international law, and political science is this: There is no
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substitute for formal ties. Without formal ties, your existence at
best is something of a para-social, political, and economic entity,
something which is less than that of a state. In this regard, we
recently had a meeting at St. Louis of the International Studies
Association on the legal status of divided states. What we have is
a situation in which there is a zero-sum game in the chapter of
recognition and the conventional international law. That is, the
winner gets all. Until 1971, the ROC was a beneficiary of
conventional international law in which we received the recogni-
tion of the majority of the states of the world. After 1971 we were
the victim of conventional international law in which a diminish-
ing number of states recognized the ROC. How can we resolve this
question? The resolution is not going to come from us; it is for the
international jurists to deal with this question. Under interna-
tional law, there are three types of international personalities:
states, belligerents, and insurgents. Where do you find divided
states? Are they belligerents? Are they insurgents? They are more
than that. The experience of the ROC has been that we try very
hard to be a good member of the international community. We
behave as a state. We adhere to all the regulations and codes of
behavior which are worthy of any entity that is a state. We are out
of the W.H.O. (World Health Organization), we are out of the
I.C.AO. (International Civil Aviation Organization), we are out of
many international organizations, but we still adhere to the rules
of behavior, with the hope that the international community will
treat us as a political system worthy of the recognition of the
world community. We are trying very hard to increase diplomatic
ties with other countries. We are not satisfied with substantive ties
- ties that are maintained only in the absence of diplomatic/for-
mal ties.
COMMENT, MR. CLOUGH: American companies investing
directly in the ROC, e.g., EXXON, do not invest lightly in
countries like Taiwan without some confidence in the future.
QUESTION [speaker unidentified]: I would like to ask Dr. Wei
about the extent of political participation in Taiwan. You have
indicated in your discussion that most of the political power is in
the hands of the Taiwanese Chinese .... What had been the
experience of minority groups in light of the fact that you have
varying political power groups in Taiwan?
DR. WEI: The ruling party is the Chinese Nationalist Party
(Kuomingtang, K.M.T.). For those who have done research on
Taiwan's political process, it has become apparent that the
process of political representation on Taiwan is far more complex
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than has been described by western scholars. In order to win
election in Taiwan, one generally must gain nomination by the
ruling party. In some cases nomination by the ruling party as a
candidate amounts to election. In selecting candidates to run for
positions, the ruling party is very careful. They want to get a
person who is respected, who has the means to run in the election
and win. So in this case, in local areas if you seek out a Mainland
Chinese to run in a predominantly Taiwanese area, you are not
going to win. 'So by necessity, the party has to select a Taiwanese
Chinese candidate. So because the Mainland Chinese are mostly
living in the cities and only a few in the countryside, the
proportion of Mainland Chinese who have won seats in the
Taiwan Provincial Assembly is less than their overall percentage
in the whole population, a situation which can be compared with
the United States in some ways. What I can say here is that it is a
deliberate effort made by the government of the ROC as well as a
natural process of gradual emergence of the majority influence.
The Constitution of the Republic of China does have certain
guarantees for minority groups to be represented in the National
Assembly and other representative organizations. The Aborigines
in Taiwan have guaranteed seats, as well as women. According
to our constitution, women must have 10 percent of the seats in all
levels of legislative bodies, which I understand is not the case in
many countries.
DR. CHIU: I want to call to your attention that in China there
are some small minorities. They have representatives in the
National Assembly. The Aborigines in Taiwan, for example,
number only 200,000, and in order to be seated in the National
Assembly you need 400,000. But they are guaranteed one seat. For
instance, in the United States, if you have about 12 percent Black,
if you use the Chinese formula, Blacks would be guaranteed at
least 12 to 15 percent or 20 percent in the U.S. Congress.
[Dr. Chiu then invited Professor James P. Chandler - the
third discussant - for this session to speak.]
PROF. CHANDLER: Dr. Chiu, I appreciate the invitation to
come. I had other commitments in St. Louis which prevented me
from leaving there until this morning. As I listened to the panel
and I looked at the panel, I noted that except for the Chairman,
they were economists and bankers and not international lawyers.
But that is what I am -- I am a professor of international law. The
last question that was discussed by Dr. Wei, I should say, the
second to the last question he discussed in response to a question
concerning the future of the ROC in the year 2000, is of interest to
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me. I have only two comments which I want to make in
connection with that. First of all, in my travels in the Republic of
China in Taiwan I have found a delightful and beautiful country,
and I have found there an extremely hospitable and happy and
contented people. This is significant, I think, in terms of our
conceptions of international law, particularly as it relates to
rights of self-determination. I think at bottom the question
becomes whether or not the current evolution of relations between
the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world
will result in great harm to the existing state of the Republic of
China. I think, under conventional ideas of international law, the
right of a desirable people, in a desirable territory, to determine for
themselves the type of government, the type of state, and the type
of allegiance they will have, is a basic and a fundamental human
right, and one that ought to be respected by the people in the
Republic of China as well as the people in the People's Republic of
China. So it is that principle of contemporary international law
which should be of overriding importance here, and I think the
current emphasis on the importance of individual rights at the
national level in this country and its probable evolution in terms
of its influence upon other states is undoubtedly to have an impact
as yet unforeseeable upon the future prospects of the Republic of
China. I want to commend Dr. Chiu for sponsoring this very fine
conference and to thank all of you for coming.
DR. CHIu: Thank you, Professor Chandler. You mentioned
that you are an international lawyer. But I want to advise the
audience that Professor Chandler is also a computer scientist. He
is now putting out a book called Computers and the Law, to be
published by the West Publishing Company, which is one of the
leading law publishers. We can entertain one more question.
QUESTION [speaker unidentified]: This concerns investment on
Taiwan. Taiwan is apparently self-sufficient in generating
capital. In the area of capital, does it really matter very much to
the Taiwan people what kind of investments are made?
MR. PILACHOWSKI: That is a very good and also a very
difficult question. In regard to the statement that only five percent
of private capital comes from outside sources, I personally believe
that it is probably a bit optimistic to say that this part of outside
capital is of the least importance. The types of projects the
government is looking toward - and this is my personal view -
are going to need substantially more input from outside, not only
in dollars but in the technology necessary to continue to expand.
If you look at their trading partners in the area - Korea, Hong
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Kong, Japan - the basic products are pretty much the same.
What flight of capital would do to the economy of Taiwan is,
again, very difficult to estimate. Obviously it would end the
expansion of technical capabilities. In case of flight of capital, it
would certainly hurt the economy of Taiwan; it's very difficult to
put a dollar value on the actual economic impact that would result
from the flight of capital.
DR. WEI: I have a comment. Foreign investment has not only
an economic meaning but also a political meaning for Taiwan,
particularly investment by important, established companies in
Taiwan. It imparts a feeling of security to overseas Chinese
investors. Also the fact that a foreign company is willing to invest
in Taiwan gives some assurance to local people and indicates
something about an objective evaluation of Taiwan. In that light,
foreign investment, although not very large in percentage terms,
has a meaning. Capital flight is a wise decision if the country
falls. If you transfer your capital out of the country and the
country does not fall, you have had it. This actually occurred with
a few people in Taiwan. There were a few people in Taiwan in
1971 or 1972 who tried to get their capital out of Taiwan - but the
problem is, Taiwan is a very favorable investment market. It has
a good stable government, stable social environment, and
relatively reasonable wages. Consider, for exarnple, a textile
factory owner with, say, 20 million NT, which is a small, but not
too small, establishment in Taiwan: when he converts that money
into U.S. dollars, it amounts to $500,000. He can only open one or
two restaurants in the United States, that's all. What can he do
with that? Therefore, when someone thinks of transferring to the
United States, he only finds that his competition with the same
factory is earning more money. So the final analysis is still the
question of profits and the favorable environment, and that, I
think, is probably a more crucial factor in determining whether
capital will stay in Taiwan.
PROF. PRYBYLA: That's like jumping over the Grand Canyon
and finding yourself short (laughter). I think that, seriously,
whatever the religion one is practicing at the moment, it is the
kind of capital that I don't think Taiwan is at present capable of
generating. They are moving to a very high-powered, very
sophisticated skill-intensive technology.
MR. Hsu: I just want to stress one point. We talk about
capital. Capital actually has several meanings. For a wealthy
Chinese industrialist who has made a lot of money in the past,
well, he's sitting on the money, he doesn't know what to do. This
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type of capital has little meaning on Taiwan economy. On the
other hand, a foreign company is trying to make an equity
investment in Taiwan - a loan that would bring in mass
technology would be used quite differently.
I also want to make a brief comment on the national
emergency situation. We all recognize that change of legislation
will take time. In the process, we also realize that many existing
laws are not being enforced. So there are two separate issues,
looking at the existence of certain laws and at what laws are
being enforced. In other words, just reading in the law books there
is a national mobilization act or a national emergency law, is
quite different from saying as a fact how much these laws are
enforced on a daily basis.
DR. CHIu: Thank you. The afternoon session will start at 2:30
p.m. sharp. The Chairperson will be Oliver Oldman, Learned
Hand Professor of Law and Director of the International Tax
Program at Harvard Law School.
The first session ended at 12:30 p.m.
Reported by Joyce Seunarine
